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Copyright Law and the Restoration of Beauty
DAVID NIMMER*
TH'BERGE v. GALERIE D'ART DU PETIT CHAMPLAIN (Thiberge)1 has long struck
me as perfectly poised to raise textbook issues of what is a "copy." The case arose
out of the purchase of an authorized poster whose ink was then chemically
removed (leaving the paper substrate blank); subsequently, the ink was trans-
ferred to a canvas without the copyright holder's permission. The Supreme Court
of Canada's opinion included the memorable line denying that "Canadian copy-
right law lives in splendid isolation from the rest of the world"2 (a fitting launch-
ing pad for some transnational observations), and also cited Professor David
Vaver's scholarly works.3 Professor Vaver's retirement from Oxford University
therefore provided the happy occasion to exhume the file and finally commit
my ruminations on Thiberge to paper.'
But a funny thing happened on the way to the filing cabinet. Pack rat that
Iam, limitless detritus of past decades presented itself, relating to almost every
country on earth, and raising a myriad of copyright conundrums. But nowhere
to be found were all the snippets that I had laboriously collected regarding Ca-
nadian cases.
So I started to resign myself to the unhappy fate of having been foiled
again-until a mental light bulb flashed, and the trap into which I had fallen
* Professor from Practice, UCLA School of Law and Of Counsel, Irell & Manella LLP, Los Angeles.
1. [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 [Thiberge].
2. Ibid. at para. 6.
3. Ibid. at para. 30. Crucially, Justice Binnie quotes Professor Vaver on the need for balance in
copyright interpretation-a theme to which the thoughts below often recur. See also Teresa
Scassa, "Originality and Utilitarian Works: The Uneasy Relationship Between Copyright
Law and Unfair Competition" (2004) 1 U. Ottawa L. & Tech. J. 53 at 59.
4. Of course, it is an added privilege to be able to pay tribute to him in the Osgoode Hall Law
Journal, given David's longtime attachment to this institution.
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manifested itself:
(al) I wished to praise Justice Binnie for setting the Court on the path of
decoupling the copyright holder's right from its maximalist conception. The
right to "multiply copies" is not violated when the owner sells one author-
ized copy (a poster) that later finds itself (via a special resin or laminating
liquid) 5 made into a different copy (canvas)-even if that latter had not
been specifically authorized-when there is still only one copy extant in
the universe;
6
(a2) That ruling forms part of the larger framework of copyright, where pro-
tection does not attach to particular material objects, but instead inheres in
conceptual types, regardless of the particular substrate in which they might
happen to be embodied;7
(bl) I was going to conclude that my plans to honour David with an ap-
propriate article had been frustrated by the disappearance of all my notes
regarding Canadian copyright law;
(b2) Meaning that I was effectively elevating the substrate over the con-
ception.
"This is too extravagant to be maintained,"8 I said to myself, reinvigorated
in my desire to compose.
Ahead I plowed. Though my past writings have inevitably drawn me to Pro-
fessor Vaver's scholarship,9 I had never allowed myself the pleasure of a sustained
reading of his accumulated works. A thing of beauty it was! Perfectly does his
oeuvre meet the definition that Robert Grosseteste propounded in the Middle
5. Thberge, supra note 1 at para. 33.
6. A useful summary of the ruling in Thdberge is: "In copyright, as in biology, reproduction
usually means adding one more unit to the species beyond what existed before." David
Vaver, "Need Intellectual Property Be Everywhere?: Against Ubiquity and Uniformity"
(2002) 25 Dal. L.J. 1 at 4 [Vaver, "Against Ubiquity and Uniformity"].
7. This is a point that I myself have elaborated. See David Nimmer, "Copyright in the Dead
Sea Scrolls" (2001) 38 Hous. L. Rev. 1 at 98-100.
8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 at 149 (1803).
9. See e.g. David Vaver, "Moral Rights Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow" (2000) 7 Int'l J.L. &
Info. Tech. 270 at 275, cited in David Nimmer, "The Moral Imperative Against Plagiarism
(Without a Moral Right Against Reverse Passing Off)" (2004) 54 DePaul L. Rev. 1 at 19, n. 96.
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Ages:1" "For beauty is a concordance and fittingness of a thing to itself and of all
its individual parts to themselves and to each other and to the whole, and of that
whole to all things.""
How pointed is the contrast with copyright doctrine, which suffers at present
from a severe absence of fittingness to itself and of all its individual parts. Con-
cordance is markedly absent in its whole and in its relationship to all things.
Recent copyright litigation in my own home district is emblematic. At issue
was not something brand new, but a technology whose copyright status had
seemingly been resolved: video cassette recorders (VCRs). 2 The Chief Execu-
tive Officer (CEO) of Turner Broadcasting testified that VCRs which allow ad
skipping amount to "theft," gilding that thought with the pronouncement that:
"Any time you skip a commercial ... you're actually stealing the programming."
When the interviewer inquired, "What if you have to go to the bathroom or get
up and get a Coke?" the grudging concession emerged: "I guess there's a certain
amount of tolerance for going to the bathroom." 3
Maximalist sentiments of that nature are so overstated that they call into
question the noble ends that copyright law is designed to serve."h If turning on a
television obligates the viewer to the extent that the call of nature must find ex-
cuse via special pleading in the guise of fair use, then copyright law itself is
headed for the toilet." Happily, though, an antidote to those sentiments exists:
10. Our honoree stands little risk of getting a Fat Head, citations to Grosseteste notwithstanding.
Note that, like our honoree, the latter taught at Oxford, albeit during the 1229-30 term (one
imagines that their paths seldom intersected).
11. Umberto Eco, Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986)
at 48.
12. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) [Sony v. Universal].
13. Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Liberties and Consumer Groups in support of Defendants'
Objections to Magistrate Judge's Discovery Order at 3, n. 5, Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
ReplayTV Inc., No. CV 01-09358 (C.D. Cal. 13 May 2002).
14. David Vaver, "Publishers and Copyright: Rights Without Duties?" (2006) 40' Bibliotheksdienst
743 at 749. "Rights without responsibility are wonderful things, especially for monopolists."
15. All of this is not to deny that philosophical lessons can emerge from television technology.
With due respect to the CEO of Turner Broadcasting, though, they lie in domains far afield
from potty breaks. Umberto Eco imagines that light signals reflected by a mirror "can in
some way be 'dematerialized' and then recomposed at their destination." Umberto Eco, Kant
and the Platypus (Orlando: Harcourt, 1997) at 371. Those musings correspond in gross form
to the magic technology that the Supreme Court of Canada confronted in Thdberge. But Eco
goes further, to posit that: "[t]his is what happens with the television image. The television
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it is the Vaverian prescription. 16 We will reach it presently.17
Sadly, the statement by Turner Broadcasting's CEO is not an isolated turn to-
ward the vulgar in copyright jurisprudence. Around the same time that it was
put into evidence in Los Angeles, a district court in Chicago18 preliminarily
enjoined distribution of Pull My Finger Fred, a figure "lounging in a chair that has
a vibrating fart and makes scatological cliches when his finger is pulled."" It turns
out that neither plaintiff nor defendant pioneered this exalted genre,2" which the
trial court traced back to Emile Zola in 1887.21
But none of this would come as a surprise to Professor Vaver, who adeptly
illustrates from another common law jurisdiction:
The concept of indirect copying was graphically illustrated in the early 1970s in New
Zealand when the manufacturer of a toilet pan connector sued another manufacturer
for infringing copyright by copying the plaintiffs connector-and won. Here was
d~j -vu all over again, for was it not Marcel Duchamp who, in a turn-of-the-century
art exhibition in New York, shocked the art world by exhibiting an upside down
urinal as a piece of art? Duchamp's ghost must have been smiling as he gazed down
on a judge in an Auckland courtroom, solemnly admitting a toilet pan connector
into the New Zealand Pantheon.
22
can be seen as an electronic mirror that shows us what is happening at distances that our
sight could not otherwise reach." Ibid.
16. Thus does Professor Vaver immunize himself from the accusation, often hurled against
academics of the tenured variety, of writing articles "to convince skeptical colleagues they are
still alive and breathing." David Vaver, "Copyright and the State in Canada and the United
States" (1996) 10 I.P.J. 187 at 193, n. 13 [Vaver, "Copyright and the State"].
17. En route, it is worth pausing to reflect that the executive's ruminations about bathroom
breaks is of a piece with David Vaver's imagination when he conjured up "an artist [who]
takes the Copyright Act and, after copying it, proceeds to do unspeakable things to it in the
name of art." Ibid. at 201.
18. JCWInvs. Inc. v. Novelty Inc., 222 F. Supp.2d 1030 at 1034-35 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
19. Ibid. at 1034.
20. Ibid. at 1030 (recounting an earlier radio sketch using the same elements).
21. Ibid. at 1030, 1036 (La Terre features a farting peasant in the French countryside named, of
all things, "Jesus-Christ").
22. David Vaver, "Creating a Fair Intellectual Property System for the 21st Century" (2001) 10
Otago L. Rev. I at 8 (Vaver, "Fair Intellectual Property System"]. See also J. Alex Ward,
"Copyrighting Context: Law for Plumbing's Sake" (1993) 17 Colum.-V.L.A.J.L & Arts 159.
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Much of the problem stems from the seemingly unlimited range of products that
can claim copyright protection. In the United States, recent years have witnessed
cases seeking copyright protection for a bewildering variety of productions:
* the design of go-:kart tracks at an amusement park;
23
* a self-propelled agricultural sprayer;
2 ,
* the disposable paper inserts used in plastic picture frames;
25
• "header bags" used in supermarkets, featuring "a meat design, corn de-
sign, fish design, and bakery design";
26
* a dinette containing a table and chairs, plus bar stools;
27
• the labels used on tanning products;
28
* the Voice, which later identified itself as Jesus,29 that gave "rapid inner
dictation" to a clinical psychologist at Columbia Presbyterian, filling
thirty stenographic notebooks;"
• the marketing plan for "'Rumba Caribbean Bar & Cuisine,' which was
intended to capture Puerto Rican traditions and folklore through food,
drinks, salsa music and dance"31 ; and so on.32
23. Fun Spot ofFlorida Inc. v. Magical Miway of Central Florida Ltd, 242 F. Supp.2d 1183 at 1186
(M.D. Fla. 2002) (granting partial motions for summary judgment; not reaching a remedy).
24. Walker Mfg. Inc. v. Hoffmann Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d 1054 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (denying
summary judgment on the copyright and reverse palming off/unfair competition claims; not
reaching copyright remedies).
25. Baker v. Urban Out/tters, Inc., 254 F. Supp.2d 346 at 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), affd mem.,
249 Fed. Appx. 845 (2d Cit. 2007) [Baker] (resolution discussed below).
26. Cannon Group Inc. v. Better Bags Inc., 250 F. Supp.2d 893 at 895, 897 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
(granting summary judgment and validating the copyright infringement claim; not reaching a
remedy).
27. Collezione Europa U.S.A., Inc. V. Hillsdale House Ltd., 243 F. Supp.2d 444 at 448
(M.D.N.C. 2003) [Collezione] (granting summary judgment and validating the copyright
subsistence; not reaching a remedy).
28. S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Australian Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp.2d 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(dismissing the copyright claim, and thereby rendering the remedy issue moot).
29. It was presumably the Real McCoy, not the character created from La Terre. See supra note 21.
30. Because the psychologist was embarrassed by the visitation, she kept the work a secret to
preserve her professional reputation. Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of
FullEndeavor, Ltd., 288 F. Supp.2d 544 at 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)'(invalidating the copyright
and dismissing the copyright claim, and thereby rendering the remedy issue moot). See also
Penguin Books U.S.A. Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor, Ltd., 262 F. Supp.2d
251 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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Going back a few years more, we can see that such cases as those complain-
ing of copying tanning labels are not at all distinctive: Quality King Distribs., Inc.
v. L Anza Research Int'l, Inc.33 was a case that reached the US Supreme Court in
which the plaintiff sought copyright protection for the labels affixed to "sham-
poos, conditioners, and other hair care products."3" The decision below had ruled
in favour of the copyright owner, allowing it to bar importation of the items
bearing the infringing label."5 The Supreme Court reversed the decision-but not
out of any consideration that copyright protection is somehow deficient when
attached to a label. Instead, its reasoning had to do with the interplay of the
doctrines of exhaustion and importation in the context of gray market goods.36
We have not yet reached the dystopia of a copyright claim over the stylized
word: COPYRIGHP7 (an extreme-stance situation that Professor Vaver was
moved to adopt in response to the baleful example of an English court granting
copyright protection to a pedestrian business letter "comprising all of three per-
fectly ordinary sentences that would have made any literary stylist blench"). 8
But we are not necessarily far away."
31. Rodriguez v. Casa Salsa Rest., 260 F. Supp.2d 413 at 415 (D.P.R. 2003) [Rodriguez]
(dismissing the copyright claim, and thereby rendering the remedy issue moot).
312. Altougt, ufo 1ud1 is nui u1ccssariiy so. C onsioer aIso
those who have sought protection for:
* the phrase "most personal sort of deodorant." See Alberto-Culver Company v. Andrea
Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1972);
* the instructions for using "pizza stones," which are rocks claimed to give "pizza
prepared at home the same texture and flavor as pizza cooked in a professional brick
oven." See Sassafras Enterprises, Inc. v. Roshco, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 343 at 344 (N.D. I11.
1995) [Sassafras];
* a pharmaceutical machine used to place medicinal pills into blister packs. See Gemel
Precision Tool Co. v. Pharma Tool Corp., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1019 (E.D. Pa. 1995) [Gemei].
33. 523 U.S. 135 (1998) [Quality King].
34. Ibid. at 138.
35. LAnza Research International, Inc. v. Quality King Disributors, Inc., 98 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1996).
36. For a discussion, see Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, looseleaf
(New York: Matthew Bender & Company, 1963) vol. 2, § 8.12[B] [6][c] [Nimmer on
Copyright].
37. David Vaver, "Rejuvenating Copyright" (1996) 75 Can. Bar Rev. 69 at 75, n. 15 [Vaver,
"Rejuvenating Copyright"].
38. Ibid. at 74.
39. A photographer, for instance, sought exclusive rights in photographs of naked babies against
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Indeed, "once short business letters written in commercialese and internal
office memoranda qualify as original literary works, the gates are flung open
to admit anything into the fold. Business forms, contracts drawn by lawyers,
answers to puzzles, any collocation of symbols meaningful to someone, are
called original literary works."" Thushas copyright law become a catch-all for
everything from bags to bar stools.
We have already moved into the Vaverian prescription:
If copyright is there to encourage the production of work that would not be produced
without this incentive, then this test should straightforwardly be applied to works for
which copyright is claimed. The result would no doubt be to exclude a large quantity
of work: not just trivial correspondence and simple drawings, but probably much
industrial design. We know that firms all over the world kept producing new designs
and other innovations even when no law protected them against copying. They were
content to gain a competitive edge by being first in the market with their new product.
Giving long protection in fact discourages innovation, since firms now have an in-
centive to rest on their laurels for the duration of the copyright instead of diverting
time and money into investing in a continuous innovation programme.41
Our mantra can be that "a fair scheme would ensure that intellectual prop-
erty deserves its 'intellectual' epithet and is not a cover for protecting the trivial,
the ephemeral, and the opportunistic."4
2
Thus armed, we can attempt to hack away from copyright's core those trivial
and opportunistic elements that do not belong. Books, movies, sculptures, and
other traditional forms of expression all remain welcome. But such products as
tanning labels and picture frame inserts-perhaps the essence of ephemera--can
be, if not courteously ushered out the door, then at least relegated to a domain
a white background. "Given the impermissibly expansive nature of Gentieu's claims," Judge
Shadur noted dryly, "it is only surprising that she has not asserted a copyright in the universe
of babies as well." Gentieu v. Tony StoneImages/Chicago, Inc., 255 F. Supp.2d 838 at 859
(N.D. Il. 2003).
40. David Vaver, "Some Agnostic Observations on Intellectual Property" (1991) 6 I.P.J. 125 at
145 [Vaver, "Agnostic Observations"] (The result is "that legislatures all over the world felt
unable to resist the ultimate reductionist logic, pressed on them by the computer industry, to
classify and protect computer programs in their electronic state as literary works: invisible,
unreadable, utilitarian-but literary nonetheless").
41. Vaver, "Fair Intellectual Property System," supra note 22 at 10.
42. Ibid. at 15.
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where their presence will not choke the proper development of protection for
the core items enumerated above.
Indeed, this lament regarding the expansion of American copyright cases to
such matters as a self-propelled agricultural sprayer arises from the same consid-
erations that occasioned Professor Vaver to lament the English decision whereby
a newspaper commits copyright infringement by publishing stills taken from a
surveillance camera. "Do we believe that the use of surveillance cameras would
drop if such films had no copyright at all? Perhaps the films should be protected
for reasons of privacy; but, if so, should not privacy be protected directly, rather
than obliquely and erratically through copyright?" 3 At the end of the day, those
willy-nilly expansions have led us to "what might be called the intellectual crisis
of intellectual property.""'
The solution to the crisis is to return beauty to copyright law. The aim here,
one must hasten to add, is not to draw aesthetic judgments. Justice Holmes's
admonition remains pointed: "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations." 5 Anyone tempted to doubt that wisdom should simply take note
of the English copyright case that attempted to offer various views on what con-
stitutes "art."" The results were "not surprisingly, not one is able to agree with
any of the five members on the panel."' 7
So, if aesthetics are not the goal, wherein does beauty lie? We must recall
that "copyright and patent laws are not isolated and immutable pieces of legisla-
tion." 8 Instead, they are rife for scrutiny to weigh whether their means achieve
the intended aims.'9 What we need is a sensible difference between how various
works are treated when all claim the copyright mantle.
43. David Vaver, "Intellectual Property: State of the Art" (2000) 116 Law Q. Rev. 621 at 631
[Vaver, "State of the Art"].
44. Ibid. at 627.
45. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 at 251 (1903).
46. George Henscber Ltd. v. Restawbile Upholstery (Lancs.) Ltd., [1976] A.C. 64, cited in Vaver,
"Agnostic Observations," supra note 40 at 133.
47. Vaver, "Agnostic Observations," ibid.
48. Ibid. at 153.
49. Ibid. ("To the extent that our society seeks some semblance of social justice, intellectual
property laws, as an important and growing part of that vision, cannot escape scrutiny").
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On the one hand, people buy books to read them, rent movies to view them,
and stream songs to listen to them. In those domains, copyright acts to protect
the expression that the public values. It is appropriate, therefore, to afford those
works the full panoply of copyright law's protections (limited, of course, by all
its exceptions).,0 We can call copyright in this context inherently expressive.
Different considerations apply, by contrast, to the expansive line of cases
cited above, in which the copyright can be called incidental to the purpose for
which the plaintiff wields it. Let us start with the marketing plan for a "Rumba
Caribbean Bar & Cuisine." As a collocation of words, the "Market Study for a
Hypertheme Restaurant in San Juan" deserves protection.5 1 But the plaintiff in
that case did not file suit to prevent copying of the wording of his plan. Instead,
he sought to shut down the Casa Salsa restaurant in South Beach, Florida. 2 The
same considerations apply to the blueprints used to create a pharmaceutical
machine used to stuff medicinal pills into blister packs.5 3 As a graphic work, the
markings on the blueprint deserve protection. Again, however, the plaintiff did
not wish to prevent copying of the blueprints; instead, it sought to prevent any
competitor from manufacturing a rival pharmaceutical machine.
A few more words are needed regarding the distinction between suits that seek
to vindicate the expressive value of a work versus those that deploy the copy-
right only for some incidental purpose. Let us start with the copyrighted text on
the label for a tanning product. In contrast to a novel, which is purchased by
readers who wish to experience its content, we may presume that customers at
the cosmetics counter are not after the joy afforded by the sparkling prose and
literary devices used to describe the lotion. At most, they are after the uncopy-
rightable information about proper dosages and application techniques, blithely
unconcerned with any alliteration or synecdoche with which they may be ex-
pressed.
50. To cite but two examples, the proprietor enjoys exclusive rights to its work-but not to
prevent fair use by members of the public. Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). By the same
token, the owner can treat its copyright as its own property-but not in a manner that
violates antitrust laws. See Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 36 at vol. 4 § 13.09[B].
51. Rodriguez, supra note 31 at 415.
52. Ibid. at 415-16.
53. Gemel, supra note 32.
562 1200947 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
The same considerations would seem to apply to images of artichokes
emblazoned on rolls of plastic bags. Customers may reach for them for the
purpose of wrapping a dozen peaches; however, that goal differs fundamen-
tally from the impulse that causes the selection of a pleasing photograph or
painting at a gallery.
In short, copyright, at its core, may involve high-brow, middle-brow, or
even low-brow works of expression. It remains true to its core justification when
that expression is desired (regardless of its aesthetic merit). But it departs from
its core purpose when the only desire is to bag produce or to procure Sun Pro-
tection Factor # 25 to lather on the skin. If copyrightable content passes in
those latter contexts, it is entirely accidental to the consumer's focus and desire.
In short, copyright arises there only incidentally.
The problem of incidental copyright protection is particularly pronounced in
the case of the tanning label. Indeed, SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare,
L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc.54 took note of the generic problem arising out of
copyright protection for labels:5
Although commercial labeling is clearly copyrightable, it has been recognized that
the "danger lurking in copyright protection for labels is that the tail threatens to wag
the dog-proprietors at times seize on copyright protection for the label in order to
leverage their thin copyright protection over the text ... on the label into a monopoly
on the typically uncopyrightable product to which it is attached.
5 6
"Used in that fashion, the copyright serves 'primarily as a means of harassing
competitors,' and thus fails 'nine times out of ten.'
5 7
In SmithKline itself, the plaintiff obtained copyright over the label used to
market Nicorette-brand gum, an aid used to quit smoking. Such aids are mar-
ketable only with permission from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
of the US government.58 Previously, SmithKline had a patent that offered it the
exclusive ability to market the gum. After the patent expired, it proceeded
54. 211 F.3d 21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000) [SmithKline].
55. Ibid. at 29, n. 5 [citations omitted].
56. Nimmeron Copyright, supra note 36, vol. 1, § 2.08lG] [2].
57. Ibid., vol. 1, § 2.08[G] [2], quoting Sassafras, supra note 32 at 345, 348.
58. Smithkline, supra note 54 at 23.
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against its competitor under copyright law. 9 But the putative copyright viola-
tion was for disseminating the same labeling with the gum-which pertinent
FDA regulations required!6 As the Second Circuit recognized, "the copyrighted
text was submitted to obtain FDA approval"61 and, as a result, conveyed market
exclusivity.
When copyright law is used to prevent a competitor from selling a rival gum,
opening a rival restaurant, building a rival machine, or selling a rival tanning
product-regardless of the implicated expression-then it is being used for an
ugly purpose, indeed. Focusing on the first case, when a customer wants medici-
nal gum, and the only way to sell that gum is to use particular expression, then
the goals of copyright law do not favour denying the customer that gum. The
situation stands fundamentally apart from a customer who wants to hear a
particular song; in that instance, someone who purveys the song without authori-
zation has provided the customer with the expression that she wants, thereby
sensibly invading the domain that copyright law was intended to protect.
By now, the tail wagging the dog (as described above) has become a "familiar
scenario."62 It is particularly familiar on the Canadian scene, given a successor
to Thiberge, namely Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc.63 This case exhibits
what I like to call the age-old struggle between the Greek nomos and logos-but
with a modern twist.6" First, though, some words of background.
59. That stance promiscuously mixes the genres: "Copyright protects persons who work in
garrets, patents protect those who work in basements." Vaver, "Agnostic Observations,"
supra note 40 at 130, n. 5.
60. In other words, during the period of SmithKline's patent protection, it had the exclusive right
to sell Nicorette gum, along with the labeling that it had created for that purpose and which
had received FDA approval. After expiration of the patent, anyone could sell Nicorette gum-
which is exactly what Watson did. But, under FDA regulations, the gum had to be accompanied
by the safety information contained in the approved labeling, which could not be altered.
61. SmithKline, supra note 54 at 29, n. 5 [citations omitted].
62. Sassafras, supra note 32 at 345. The defendant avoided infringement by altering the precise
language that described its competitive pizza stone, which possessed the same features as the
plaintiffs. Note that this is the case quoted by SmithKline, supra note 54.
63. [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20 [Euro-Excellence].
64. See Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law ofJus Publicum Europaeum
(New York: Telos Press, 2003) at 342 (noting that Cicero translated nomos as lex and
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We have already encountered Quality King, the US Supreme Court case
about labels attached to shampoo bottles purchased abroad in the gray market.
Euro-Excellence, for its part, deals with C6te d'Or and Toblerone chocolate bars
imported into Canada after purchase abroad in the gray market, likewise bear-
ing labels subject to copyright protection. Both the US Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court of Canada reversed the judgment below in favour of the plain-
tiff copyright owner, based on their readings of the scope of direct and secon-
dary liability in the context of gray market goods (the manufacture of which, by
definition, is authorized by the pertinent copyright owner, but outside the rele-
vant jurisdiction). But it is not that aspect of the rulings that warrants comment
here.
Let us start with the approach of Justice Bastarache (joined by Justices LeBel
and Charron). Building on the objectives of the Copyright Act"s as articulated in
Thdberge" and subsequent cases,"7 he concluded:
[I]f a work of skill and judgment (such as a logo) is attached to some other consumer
good (such as a chocolate bar), the economic gains associated with the sale of the
consumer good must not be mistakenly viewed as the legitimate economic interests of
the copyright holder of the logo that are protected by the law of copyright. ... Thus s.
27(2)(e) [of the Canadian Copyright Act] is meant to protect copyright holders from
the unauthorized importation of works which are the result of their skill and judg-
ment. it is not meant to protect manufacturers from the unauthorized importation
of consumer goods on the basis of their having a copyrighted work affixed to their
wrapper, this work being merely incidental to their value as consumer goods.... The
laws of trade-mark and passing off provide protection to manufacturers who fear the
importation of cheap imitations of their products with a copy of the logo of the real
product affixed to them.
68
How is the line to be drawn? Justice Bastarache conceded that it will not
always be easy to determine when a work is merely incidental to consumer good-
will, but posited that: "If a reasonable consumer undertaking a commercial trans-
postulating that: "The connection between logos and nomos meant that the logos, as
something lacking passion and thus reason, was placed above the instinctive and emotional
character of the human individual"). See also Fred Lawrence, "David Novak on Natural
Law: An Appraisal" (1999) 44 Am. J. Juris. 151 at 158 (invoking "the classical passage from
conventional nomos to explanatory logos").
65. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42.
66. Euro-Excellence, supra note 63 at 76.
67. Ibid. at paras. 80-81.
68. Ibid. at paras. 85-87.
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action does not think that the copyrighted work is what she is buying or dealing
with, it is likely that the work is merely incidental to the consumer good."
69
Onward to the promised struggle.
Nomos, according to the first line of the Harvard Law Review's 1982 round-
up of Supreme Court cases, connotes "a normative universe."7 But that is not
the sense implied here. Rather, the term has been domesticated, by which I mean
that it has been brought into the house. The Greek roots for "house" (oikos)
and "custom" (nomos) combine (oikonomos) to yield a common English word:
economics. That term (together with its cognates) recurs thirty-five times in the
various opinions in Euro-Excellence. Indeed, the crux of the disagreement among
the justices boiled down to disparate views of "legitimate economic interests"-
a phrase drawn from Thdberge.7"
Logos, according to the first line of the Gospel ofJohn, connotes The Word
(Incarnate). But that is not the sense implied here. Rather, it is simply the plural
of logo, the emblem of a commercial brand. A logo is the subject matter of
purported copyright in Euro-Excellence.
The "economy of logos" perfectly maps the issue presented. Justice Basta-
rache elaborates that a t-shirt emblazoned with the reproduction of a painting
may constitute the sale of a copyrighted work-and distinguishes that situation
from the sale of a t-shirt bearing a small logo on the shirt pocket.72 He nicely
illustrates the distinction between incidental and inherently expressive works. In
the latter case, the logo is simply incidental to the shirt that the customer wants.
In economic terms, the logo serves the classic trademark function of letting the
consumer know the origin of the goods. By contrast, if the customer wants to
display the painting (by wearing it or otherwise), she presumably wishes to do
so for its expressive content. In that context, she is not choosing the painting by
reference to the source of origin of the goods (though that concern might sepa-
rately animate her purchasing decision).
69. Ibid. at para. 94.
70. Robert Cover, "Nomos and Narrative" (1983) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4. Professor Cover notes
that the Septuagint translated "Torah" into Greek as "nomos."
71. Euro-Excellence, supra note 63 at paras. 7, 8, 76, 79-81.
72. Ibid. at para. 95.
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Sometimes, however, the customer wants the logo precisely for its expres-
sive content. Imagine that Major League Baseball has licensed Fun Industries
to sell t-shirts of every member team. A customer who wishes to purchase a
t-shirt emblazoned with the logo of the Toronto Blue Jays values the t-shirt
for its expressive context, and will not be equally satisfied with one emblazoned
with the logo of the Los Angeles Dodgers (even if legitimately manufactured by
Fun Industries).7" In that context, the logo deserves copyright protection no
less than the painting. In short, the logo's content is hardly incidental in that
context. Again, the "economy of logos" captures this distinction. Justice Basta-
rache distils the essence of the matter when noting that "a copyrighted instruc-
tion booklet included in the box of some consumer good would, as copyrighted
work, be merely incidental to the good."7 His conclusion follows inexorably:
[T]he protected works in question-the C6te d'Or and Toblerone logos, considered
as copyrighted works--cannot be seen as anything other than merely incidental to
the chocolate bars to which they are affixed. Therefore, Euro-Excellence's dealings
with the chocolate bars are not caught within the language of s. 27(2) of the Act.
75
This is not to deny the copyrightable status of the logos; the plaintiff would
have prevailed if it had complained about a sale of posters of the logo.76 But
Justice Bastarache drew the necessary distinctions "to ensure that this legitimate
copyright protection is not illegitimately leveraged into a protection for a market
in consumer goods.""
73. One particular piece of litigation in the United States over the usage of logos of a sports team in
that manner has been protracted, implicating myriad doctrines of copyright law. See Bouchat
v. Baltimore Ravens, Inc., 228 F.3d 489 (4th Cir. 2000), amended, 241 F.3d 350 (4th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1038 (2001), on remand, 215 F. Supp.2d 611 (D. Md. 2002), 327
F. Supp.2d 537 (D. Md. 2003), aftd, 506 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
2054 (2008).
74. Euro-Excellence, supra note 63 at para. 95.
75. Ibid. at para. 99.
In this appeal, the logos, considered as copyrighted works, are inarguably best described as
merely incidental to the chocolate bars themselves. It cannot be reasonably maintained that
in the course of a commercial transaction in which a customer buys a C6te d'Or or a
Toblerone chocolate bar from a merchant, the customer is actually paying for a copyrighted
work. This is not a situation in which the copyrighted work, as such, is an important aspect
of the consumer transaction: it is a logo on a wrapper for a product which serves to identify
the product's origins, nothing more.
76. Ibid. at para. 103.
77. Ibid. His analysis does not deny (at para. 104)
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Notwithstanding my own encomium set forth above, the opinion of Justice
Bastarache did not win approval from a majority of the Supreme Court in Euro-
Excellence. In particular, Justice Abella, writing in dissent (and joined by Justice
McLachlin), took issue with it fundamentally.78 Even the majority opinion,
authored by Justice Rothstein, sets forth its reasons at the outset for rejecting
the approach of Justice Bastarache." Although conceding that disallowing pro-
tection for "incidental works" harmonizes well with Australian copyright law,
the majority saw no warrant for reading that distinction into the handiwork of
the Canadian Parliament.8"
Ironically, the majority opinion was joined by Justices Binnie and Des-
champs. 8 Thus, I find myself in the position of simultaneously celebrating
Justice Binnie's focus on "legitimate economic interests" in Th~berge and lament-
ing his limitation of that doctrine in Euro-Excellence. Which is the better statutory
interpretation of the words enacted in Ottawa, I leave to others. My point here
is to approve on policy grounds the initial thrust of Justice Binnie in Thiberge
and extended by Justice Bastarache in Euro-Excellence: copyright policy should
value inherent expression and, in the process, devalue incidental utilizations,
without placing it wholly outside copyright protection on that basis. Beauty lies
in that realization. More power to Canberra, if its legislature is the only one to
formalize that distinction to date.
the possibility-indeed, the certainty-that the logos, as trade-marks, can play a large role in
the sale of the chocolate bars and are of great value to KCI. It is not disputed that part of the
reason that a consumer buys a C6te d'Qr bar or a Toblerone bar is because of the reputation
and goodwill associated with each brand. But that is not a consideration which is relevant
under the Copyright Act. It cannot be reasonably maintained that anyone buys a C6te d'Or
or Toblerone because of the logos as works of art.
78. Ibid. at para. 111.
To inject an exception for logos on the basis that they are "incidental" would be to introduce
unnecessary uncertainty, inviting case-by-case judicial explorations into the uncharted area of
what is "merely" incidental, "somewhat" incidental, or not incidental at all. Such an ap-
proach also takes insufficient account of the reality that many products are, to a significant
extent, sold on the basis of their logo or packaging.
79. Ibid. at para. 1. Justice Rothstein went on to say: "I see no statutory authority for the
proposition that 'incidental' works are not protected by the Copyright Act" (at para. 4).
80. Ibid. at para. 5.
81. One should add that the majority opinion, like Thiberge before it, cites to Vaver. See ibid. at
para. 26. In fact, this later case even cites to Nimmer on Copyright. See ibid. at para. 43.
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Given the glut of copyright litigation arising at the periphery of desired expres-
sion, as exemplified by all of the cases cited above, some relief is in order. The
relief that is needed is to limit the available remedies. Copyright holders who
bring suit to vindicate protection for such matters as the design of their go-kart
tracks are not seeking the moral victory of a judgment in their favour. Instead,
their goal is to benefit in the real world. That benefit typically takes two forms:
monetary recovery and injunctive relief.
Let us begin by looking at the former domain. When we examine the US
cases canvassed above, ranging from the go-kart to the Caribbean Bar, an inter-
esting phenomenon emerges. Under current law, cases with plaintiffs who at-
tempt to wield copyrights incidentally for collateral benefits do not result in
meaningful financial recovery. Indeed, those cases, with one exception, have
actually resulted in no damages at all. 2
The sole exception is Collezione Europa U.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsdale House,
Ltd.83-the case that involved the copying of a dinette set. That opinion vali-
dated copyright protection for the designs at issue, holding them to pass the
Copyright Act's separability test.8" Inasmuch as the defendant, for all intents and
purposes, copied those designs identically, the court upheld the plaintiffs claim,
which then proceeded to the damages stage.
It shnild he noted rhnt Collevinne Furonpa filed suir not to nrvenr Hilldlelp
House from selling furniture, but rather to stop it from selling the exact design
that the plaintiff had originated. As such, this suit properly 5 arose to vindicate
the expressive ingredients of the copyright, not the incidental purpose of inter-
fering with the defendant's business outside that expressive realm. This case
furnishes the exception that therefore proves the rule.
Further vindication for the rule that cases alleging copyright infringement
incidentally do not financially benefit their proponents emerges from Baker v.
82. See supra notes 23-32.
83. Collezione, supra note 27.
84. Under US law, a "useful article" cannot obtain copyright protection unless it contains
elements that are separable from its utilitarian features. Depending on the law of the
applicable circuit, that separability may be either physical or conceptual. See Nimmer on
Copyright, supra note 36, vol. 1, § 2.08 [B] [3].
85. A background issue exists as to whether copyright law should extend into the arena of
industrial designs. If not, then this result is unfortunate on that basis. But that domain is
analytically separate from the matter currently under investigation, viz. the distinction
between expressive and incidental invocations of copyright protection.
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Urban Outfitters, Inc.8 -the case that involved frame inserts. In that instance,
the plaintiff was not truly concerned with any appropriation of the expressive
elements that it had imbued into those disposable inserts. It is doubtful, to say
the least, whether any customers had bought frames because of the aesthetic ap-
peal of those inserts, which were headed for the trash as soon as the purchasers
were able to display photos of their own daughters blowing out candles.
The plaintiff, Kent Baker, prevailed on his copyright claim, demonstrating
the sale of 862 unlicensed inserts, on which the defendant earned gross profits
of $3,896. Baker's past practice was to license such uses for less than $100. The
court initially granted partial summary judgment to limit damages to a maximum
of $3,896.87 Then, because of Baker's "contumacious and disruptive" behaviour,
the court awarded Urban Outfitters $20,000 for opposing Baker's meritless
motions.88 Ultimately, Judge Preska awarded the defendant almost $400,000 in
fees under the Copyright Act, plus additional sums on other bases.89 She reached
that determination to deter future plaintiffs from figuring "that they can score big
if they win and that there will be no adverse consequences if they lose."9" Most
telling in that regard was the statement by the plaintiff's agent to the plaintiffs
lawyer that "his case is 'great' because it involves 'a lot of STUPID,91 obstinate,
deep pocketed, WILLFUL INFRINGERS."'92
Viewed from this perspective, the law has done a decent job of preventing
windfalls to plaintiffs who seek to benefit from incidental enforcement of their
copyrights. Why, then, have such cases continued to proliferate?
The answer is that the plaintiffs count on the presumption that they will win in-
junctive relief if they prevail. Under those circumstances, the pain to the defen-
86. Baker, supra note 25.
87. Baker, supra note 25 at 359.
88. Baker v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 431 F. Supp.2d 351 at 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) [Baker (2006)].
89. Ibid at 358.
90. Ibid. at 359.
91. The discerning will recognize that stylization as a thinly-veiled rip-off of the celebrated
Vaverian COPYRIGHT. See text accompanying note 37. If not consciously copied, it
evidences, at a minimum, cryptomnesia. See e.g. Vaver, "Agnostic Observations," supra note
40 at 131, n. 7.
92. Baker (2006), supra note 88 [emphasis and capitalization in original].
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dant of complying with the injunction will be too great, and the plaintiff will
have won itself a "blank cheque." In a case arising from the label on tanning
butter, the plaintiff typically is not honestly seeking to impose new verbiage on
the defendant's rival label. Instead, the plaintiff is banking on the fact that an
injunction against further distribution of the product bearing the offending
label will prove ruinous to the defendant, to the extent that it already has in the
pipeline hundreds of thousands of canisters pressed with the subject label.93
Historically, that was a safe bet, for courts have routinely ruled that "a pre-
vailing copyright holder is entitled to a permanent injunction."" In other words,
once a plaintiff prevailed in an infringement case, the entry of an injunction
became automatic. Moreover, all that the plaintiff needed to obtain a prelimi-
nary injunction pending resolution was the likelihood of prevailing at trial.9"
Accordingly, there was every incentive to file suit quickly. As long as the
incidental usage of the copyright seemed likely to lead to judgment in favour of
the plaintiff, the court's equitable powers could be enlisted to obtain an injunc-
tion. Thereafter, the defendant's only live option in many cases would be to
salvage its marketing via the payment of vast tribute to the plaintiff. It was good
business for lucky owners of copyrights that had been abused in ancillary fashion,
such as appearing in the label for a popular tanning lotion.
But success has not always been preordained. Some courts have rebelled against
that construction.
93. The most striking example of this phenomenon actually unfolded in a context involving an
expressive, rather than an incidental, invocation of copyright. A Swiss artist complained that
part of his imagery was used in Terry Gilliam's film 12 Monkeys. Although the infringing
material occupied less than 5 minutes of the defendants' 130-minute film, the district court
ordered a preliminary injunction against its exploitation. See Woods v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Inasmuch as prints had already been struck, it was
impossible to meet the theatrical distribution schedule for the film consonant with an
injunction, meaning that the artist obtained a blank cheque from the studio. It remains only
to add the irony that the defendant, Gilliam, who argued in this case that any appropriation
was minimal, is the same individual who had previously been a plaintiff shouting righteous
indignation when Hollywood had dared to tamper with his own sacrosanct "Monty Python"
television show. See Gilliam v. American Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
94. Robinson v. Random House, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 830 at 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) [Robinson]
[emphasis added). See generally Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 36, vol. 4, § 14.06[Bl[][a].
95. See generally Nimmeron Copyright, ibid., vol. 4 , § 14.06[A][2][cl.
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Consider American Direct Marketing, Inc. v. Azad Int'l, Inc. (American Direct
Marketing), a case concerning competing tooth-whitening products.96 If the de-
fendant violated the plaintiffs trade dress, relief could be found on that basis.
But, instead, the plaintiff alleged violation of the copyright of an insert to the
product that was a trivial addition to its salability. The true purpose of the in-
junction sought by the plaintiff was to interfere with the defendant's sales of the
underlying product, which was itself uncopyrightable.97 The court declined to
issue that remedy, instead stating: "the proper remedy for infringement of the
copyright in the images on a package which has withstood a trade dress claim
between the same parties is most likely a fee based on the shown value of the
image."98
American Direct Marketing's resolution calls attention to the beauty of the
common law's development of rules through successive cases. As authority for
its approach, the opinion continued, "[t]he copyright statute allows but does not
command injunctive relief."9 9 At the time the court articulated that language,
the statement flew in the face of typical pronouncements (noted above) that "a
prevailing copyright holder is entitled to a permanent injunction.""' ° But the
court bolstered its conclusion by citing a slender line of cases that had picked
up on the flexibility urged by Nimmer on Copyright in the 1980s, arguing that,
under special circumstances, an injunction could be denied, and the plaintiff
could be remitted to payment pursuant to what essentially amounted to a judi-
cially ordered compulsory license. 1 '
Lo and behold, that trickle of cases later became a tidal wave: in 2006, the
US Supreme Court ruled, as a general matter, that copyright injunctions are not
mandatory." 2 As a consequence, courts at present may order ongoing monetary
payments in lieu of an injunction in all types of cases.1"3 Accordingly, it is no
96. 783 F. Supp. 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) [American Direct Marketing].
97. Ibid. at 96-98.
98. Ibid. at 97.
99. Ibid.
100. Robinson, supra note 94.
101. See Nimmeron Copyright, supra note 36, vol. 4, § 14.06[B11][b].
102. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). See generally ibid., vol. 4,
§ 14.06[B][1][c].
103. Some courts vociferously deny that they are ordering a "judicially-created compulsory
license." Christopher Phelps &Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532 at 546 (4th Cir. 2007). I
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longer revolutionary to rule that "the proper remedy for infringement of the
copyright ... is most likely a fee." 0"'
I respectfully urge that the rule be generalized beyond American Direct
Marketing-like cases of a defendant prevailing on trade dress grounds. Instead,
the dividing line should be the one posited above, between claims intended to
vindicate the expressive aspects of a copyrightable- work, and those in which the
copyright happens to be incidental to the complaint. In American Direct Mar-
keting, the insert was strictly incidental; the plaintiffs true goal was to inhibit
the defendant from selling its rival tooth-whitening product. Given that such
products stand outside copyright protection, the copyright infringement claim
was essentially pretextual.
When American Direct Marketing articulated its standard, it had little pre-
cedential warrant. Today, its application can properly be applied across the board.
Courts should now routinely withhold injunctive relief in all incidental copyright
cases.
The American Direct Marketing experience shows the benefit of the common
law tradition, by which US courts are free to craft the law according to their
own notions of optimal results. Indeed, the pressures that arise in a common law
system to find the appropriate solution under all circumstances are inevitably
great:
[R]eal people live in copyrightable structures, get married in copyrightable garments,
and discuss their most intimate life experiences in copyrightable prose. In a system
rooted in equity that strives for justice (if only occasionally), those disparate circum-
stances cannot help but percolate into the structure of decision-making in the copy-
right arena. The myriad rules [of US copyright law] are accordingly subject to in-
numerable caveats and tailored loopholes, as judges in the common law system at-
tempt to reconcile fidelity to Congress' words and stare decisis with sensitivity to the
actual litigants pleading their cases in concrete circumstances.
105
have urged that "a less defensive interpretation would be" to acknowledge that license for
what it is. Nimmer on Copyright, ibid., vol. 4, § 14.06[B][1][c].
104. As usual, David Vaver was ahead of the curve. Contemporaneous with the Sony ruling in the
United States, a Canadian case suggested that refusing an injunction was "tantamount" to
granting a compulsory license without statutory authority. R. v. James Lorimer & Co., [1984]
1 F.C. 1065. Our friend criticized the Court of Appeal's ruling as "nonsense." Vaver,'
"Copyright and the State," supra note 16 at 204, n. 48 ("But an injunction is always
discretionary. On the court's theory, any time an injunction is refused the court is issuing an
unauthorized compulsory licence; which is nonsense").
105. Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 36, vol. 1, Overview [citations omitted].
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The phenomenon is not to be lamented, but celebrated. The strength of the
common law system is its ability to find the solution appropriate to its precise
circumstances. In turn, cross-system comparisons may deepen our knowledge:
the .solutions to problems before US courts inevitably differ from those adopted
north of the border, as well as on the far side of the Atlantic or Down Under.
Happily, the considerations ventilated above help us in another way as well.
They point out the way to restore beauty to at least one aspect of copyright
law: to the extent that cases arise to vindicate not the expressive elements of a
copyrightable work, but, instead, the incidental purposes, courts should rou-
tinely deny injunctive relief and should minimize the award of damages. Those
expedients will presumably serve to minimize complaints alleging copyright in-
fringement of most labels, header bags, frame inserts, and the like. Copyright
law will instead be able to focus on its core purpose of protecting expression
that human beings actually want." 6
Two critiques of this distinction may arise: (1) it discriminates against cer-
tain types of copyright; and (2) it allows third parties to "free ride" with impu-
nity on others' efforts.
(1) In a sense, this proposal will benefit certain copyrights over others. That
stance offends the egalitarian sensibilities that have arisen in common law coun-
tries with regard to copyright protection. As David Vaver notes, we tend to
"treat copyright as a capacious church that admits almost anyone-sound re-
corders, broadcasters, cablecasters, even printers-into its congregation of 'au-
thors' and anoints them all with a 'copyright."'"" 7 Discrimination is bad, so this
type of prejudice has no place in a civilized system, the argument concludes.
That conclusion should be rejected. As Professor Vaver"' himself recog-
nizes, apropos of Thiberge, "[u]biquity and uniformity are not always virtues in
106. Of course, this solution is far from a panacea. One court protected computer software in a
context when no human being wished to benefit from its expression. See Ticketmaster L.L.C.
v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp.2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2007). This writer has condemned
that approach at length elsewhere. See ibid., vol. 3, § 13.05[D][3] [b]. But that particular
conundrum would not be solved by distinguishing intrinsic from incidental utilizations.
Instead, it is inherent in the very process of embracing computer software in the copyright
ambit-a deficit which David Vaver has already called to our attention. Vaver, "Agnostic
Observations," supra note 40.
107. David Vaver, "The Copyright Mixture in a Mixed Legal System: Fit for Human
Consumption?" (2001) 5 E.J.C.L. 2, online: <http://www.ejcl.org/52/art52-3.html>.
108. Vaver, "Against Ubiquity and Uniformity," supra note 6 at 3.
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law."1' 9 Proceeding from the aperfu that "a step backwards is a step in the right
direction if you are facing the wrong way to begin with," he offers, "[w]e should
start stepping backwards in the right direction. We should ask ourselves
whether extra intellectual property (IP) protection is really needed, and, where
it is not, repeal it."'' 5
Happily, the task at hand is easier. Far from needing to convene the legisla-
ture to repeal an existing statute, it simply involves concerted judicial action (in
line with American Direct Marketing and similar precedents) to deny injunctive
and large monetary relief to copyrights that are invoked incidentally rather than
intrinsically. The current scheme of copyright protection, with all its attendant
remedies, such as large monetary awards and the coercive force of an injunc-
tion, is the fruit of hundreds of years of development, largely aimed at such
productions as printed books, theatrical motion pictures, and recorded music.
Those remedial devices may work well in the paradigmatic cases for which they
were designed; but, at the same time, they can be recognized as ill-suited for
other applications along the lines of go-kart track blueprints"'
In other words, we need not go quite as far as "trimming copyright back to its
traditional belles lettres and beaux arts vocation, while establishing a parallel quasi
copyright system that is designed to protect investment in useful innovation. '112
109. Our good don mobilizes the point to defend cross-border variations: "A nation should,
within broad limits, be free to strike its own balance in its IP laws to suit its own
circumstances: Fewer and more varied IP laws should be considered virtues, not vices." Ibid.
at 3. But so sensible is that perspective that this article applies it within one nation's domestic
scheme to variations between different species of copyrights, whenever the current scheme is
"incoherent and morally indefensible." Ibid.
110. Ibid. at 26.
111. Again, the antecedent is Vaverian, along two planes:
(1) "It would be remarkable ... if a system of protection introduced for books nearly three
centuries ago is adequate for the task of stimulating desirable levels of production in the
cultural sector today." Vaver, "Rejuvenating Copyright," supra note 37 at 76-77.
(2) "Intellectual property rights have become more intense and all encompassing. Thus,
starting modestly in the eighteenth century to control the unauthorised reprints of
books, the law of copyright steadily grew to encompass partial reprints, then subtler
forms of imitation and then expanded exponentially throughout the twentieth century.
With each fresh logical step in one direction, a vista of new paths appeared and further
steps were taken along them to intensify the rights." Vaver, "State of the Art," supra
note 43 at 625.
112. Vaver, "Rejuvenating Copyright," supra note 37 at 77.
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Instead, we simply need to trim the remedies that are granted at the periphery
in those instances where the value in the copyright inheres not in its intrinsic ex-




(2) What about the free ride that this proposal would allow second-comers
on the header bags, frame inserts, and tanning labels laboriously developed by
their predecessors? That cavil can be disposed of summarily: "Simply to 'free-
ride' on another's business efforts or investment is not wrong" in and of itself.'
Or, as the US Supreme Court has phrased the matter, "[copyright] protection
has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible uses
of his work.""' 6 The courts of other nations likewise favour free competition" 7
when there has been no overt trespass."'
113. The distinction offered here is not simply between artistic and utilitarian works. See e.g.
Scassa, supra note 3. A tanning label is presumably utilitarian, but may be used in a given
context to exploit its expressive aspects, in which case it deserves as much protection as a
work of great art.
114. To revert to the tanning label, its expression presumably falls short of belle, rendering it
'unlikely to become the beau of the ball. Yet, by itself, those considerations do not place it on
either side of the current divide.
" If, as seems likely, consumers have no interest in the content of the label, and the
manufacturer treats that content merely as information, then a lawsuit alleging its
infringement can be placed on the incidental side of the ledger. Available remedies in
that case are to be severely circumscribed.
" Nonetheless, expectations may be confounded. Perhaps the cosmetic company desires
to turn the label into op art, or produces flyers that contain the label as an ode to kitsch
or to celebrate business prose of an earlier era. It could be that empty canisters might
even be sold as attractive sculptures. Should those hypothetical instances be realized, a
subsequent infringement suit would arise on the expressive side.
In short, the label itself is not prejudiced by its failure to achieve literary and artistic prowess.
The totality of the circumstances surrounding the work's exploitation indicates whether the
subject lawsuit should be treated as incidental or expressive.
115. Vaver, "Rejuvenating Copyright," supra note 37 at 73.
116. Sony v. Universal, supra note 12 at 432.
117. Illustrative cases include the one with which we started. As an artist, M. Th6berge claimed
that the defendant had made "an abusive commercialization of my work, without
authorization." Theberge, supra note 1 at para. 20. Of course, as recited at the outset, the
Supreme Court of Canada denied his claim.
118. "We were recently reminded of how deeply the principle of freedom to compete is engrained
in the national psyche by some English litigation a few years ago, where a company claimed
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But there has been exactly overt trespass, some may respond, in the cases of
copied header bags and instructional labels. The answer to that point of view is
that copyright "cannot be treated as an absolute value," such that copying
something is automatically viewed as trespass. " 9 Indeed, we would not even in-
voke the label of trespass but for the notion that "intellectual property is prop-
erty," a circularity to which David Vaver has already sensitized us. 2'
The need for balance is paramount here. As Justice Binnie observed in Thiberge,
"excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property
may unduly limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish crea-
tive innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole, or create practical
obstacles to proper utilization."'
121
Often throughout history, copyright has expanded. Contraction can be equally
necessary 22 to achieve the proper social goal.
23
The best line-drawing pays heed to balance and gains public respect for in-
tellectual property laws. 24 Indeed, the alternative to achieving balance is "cyni-
damages for various alleged business wrongs, including an act of unfair competition. In
rejecting the suit, Justice Harman said that the claim amounted 'to saying that there has
been competition, and adding the old nursery cry "It's unfair!" To that I would only cite my
nanny's great nursery proposition: "The World is a very unfair place and the sooner you
get to know it the better."' Whereas the theories of John Maynard Keynes may come and
go, the dicta of Sir Jeremiah Harman's former nanny may indelibly leave their mark on
judicial policy." Vaver, "Fair Intellectual Property System," supra note 22 at 5 [citations
omitted].
119. Vaver, "State of the Art," supra note 43 at 637.
120. Ibid. at 636. Justice McLachlin of the Supreme Court of Canada is quoted to similar effect
in Fara Tabatabai, "A Tale of Two Countries: Canada's Response to the Peer-to-Peer Crisis and
What It Means for the United States" (2006) 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2321 at 2321 ("We must
stop thinking of intellectual property as an absolute and start thinking of it as a function").
121. Thiberge, supra note 1 at para. 32. See Margaret Ann Wilkinson, "National Treatment,
National Interest and the Public Domain" (2004) 1 U. Ottawa L. & Tech. J. 23 at 37.
122. "It is in the nature of the subject that intellectual property concepts have to evolve to deal
with new and unexpected developments in human creativity." Thiberge, supra note 1 at
para. 75.
123. Professor Vaver has already wickedly skewered the Eurotopia fantasy that if "copyright is
good, ... then more copyright is even better." David Vaver, "Copyright Developments in
Europe: The Good, the Bad and the Harmonized" in Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock
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cism, disregard and avoidance."12 Copyright law needs to draw a line. On one
side, full protection (subject to all applicable limitations and defenises) should
continue to apply to works copied for the purpose of experiencing their expres-
sive content. On the other, highly circumscribed remedies will be all that a plain-
tiff can hope to obtain when she seeks not to vindicate that expression, but to
obtain advantage in a realm that is not itself subject to copyright protection.
Hopefully, this modest change will restore some lost beauty to copyright
doctrine. If it does, the credit belongs to a lifetime of insights that emerge from
David Vaver's extraordinary corpus of copyright scholarship.
125. Ibid

